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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades state-based diaspora engagement institutions have proliferated. 
Meanwhile, the surge in diaspora engagement initiatives by non-state global governance 
actors is also on the rise. However, such ‘global-ising’ of diaspora engagement does not 
describe a simple ‘scaling-up’ of policies from the domestic to the supranational level. 
Rather, it suggests a reconfiguration of policies, actors and spaces by and through which 
diasporas are now being engaged/governed. No doubt, this calls for a reassessment of 
existing analytical frameworks. This paper makes the case for a new ontological perspective 
for studying global diaspora governance. It proposes that existing analyses of diaspora 
governance lack explanatory power for a number of reasons. They either fall into the trap of 
methodological nationalism, and thus fail to account for the complexities of contemporary 
global social and political configurations, or, if they do problematise complexity, they do so 
in a way that depoliticises global governance processes. Instead, this paper argues for a 
critical realist ontology, which suggests that we think about global diaspora engagement 
through the concept of the assemblage. Assemblages, this paper argues, allow us to consider 
global diaspora engagement as complex relations between human and non-human agents 
whose configurations shape the conditions of possibility for action in a particular 
circumstance. When paired with Bourdieusian practice theory, the assemblage can also act as 
the (de-/reterritorialised) field within which practices are hierarchically ordered, thus 
enabling the study of how political struggles unfold inside specific configurations of global 
diaspora engagement.  
                                                                                                           
1 A draft of this paper was prepared for the “Beyond Positivism Conference”, Critical Realism Network, 8-10 
August 2017, Montreal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has seen a steady proliferation of institutions set up by states to harness the 
economic, social and political potential of their emigrant populations. A study found that in 
2013 over half of United Nations member states had formal institutions dedicated to 
emigrants and their descendants.2 These institutions have taken the form of symbolic and 
institutional capacity building processes; the extension of rights to the diaspora, such as 
voting-rights, dual nationality, extension of civil and social services; as well as extracting 
obligations from the diaspora through, for example, investment policies on remittances and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) capture.3 More recently, there has also been a huge surge in 
interest directed at diasporas from countries with large immigrant populations, such as the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as non-state actors such as the EU4 
and the World Bank (WB), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and the 
private sector. Under Hillary Clinton’s leadership, the US State Department set up the 
International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA), a public-private partnership designed 
to harness the potential of diaspora populations residing in the US to contribute to social and 
economic development in their countries of origin. Meanwhile, NGOs such as UK-based 
International Alert or the Mosaic Institute in Canada are working with diaspora peace-
builders to confront prejudice on the involvement of diaspora communities in so-called 
‘home-grown terrorism’ or ‘imported-conflict’ in the EU and North America5. Diaspora 
engagement is thus being pursued not only by states, but by a complex global set of actors 
that are operating beyond the state-level, across a multiplicity of spaces. It has 
overwhelmingly been framed as an operational strategy or management tool6, thought to 
enhance the legitimacy of global governance interventions by diversifying the range of actors 
involved in decision-making. However, the inclusion of some diasporas in these engagement 
strategies necessitates the exclusion of others. Thus, far from apolitical best practice diaspora 
engagement for remains contested and highly political. It produces hierarchies within and 
among diaspora groups, and it can create and reify oppressive and exclusionary categories 
related to diasporas and migrants more widely (the terrorist-financier, or the “model 
minority” for example). But how exactly are these boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
drawn? 
A growing body of scholarship, primarily in the disciplines of International Relations (IR) 
and Human Geography, has been addressing the politics of diaspora engagement. 
Overwhelmingly, explanations for diaspora engagement or non-engagement are considered 
                                                                                                           
2 Alan Gamlen, Michael Cumming, Paul M. Vaaler and Laura Rossouw, “Explaining the Rise of Diaspora 
Institutions,” IMI Working Paper Series 78 (2013). 
3 Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They and What Kinds of States Use Them?” Working 
paper. COMPAS, University of Oxford (2006). 
4 Giulia Sinatti, Cindy Horst, “Migrants as Agents of Development: Diaspora Engagement Discourse and Practice 
in Europe,” Ethnicities 15 no. 1 (2015): 134–52. 
5 John Monahan, Rima Berns-McGown, and Michael Morden. 2014. “The Perceptions and Reality of ‘Imported 
Conflict’ in Canada,” (2014), http://mosaicinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/15.pdf. 
6 For example, “The Diaspora Option”, in Hélène Pellerin, Beverley Mullings, “The ‘Diaspora Option’, Migration 
and the Changing Political Economy of Development.” Review of International Political Economy 20, no.1 (2013): 89–
120. 
Article / Critical Realism, assemblages and practices beyond the state 
102 
to be located at the level of structural developments, either as a function of neoliberal 
capitalism7 or the Western drive to discipline diasporic bodies8 in order to stabilise liberal 
order in the global South9. Such critical assessments give us interesting accounts of the 
political logics that might be driving interest in diaspora engagement. And yet, the idea that 
a singular and universal logic is driving diaspora engagement is not entirely convincing. 
Especially, because most of the above accounts remain married to a nation-state centric 
understanding of global political processes, which brings with it several problems. 
Consider the following: There have emerged a small number of Tamil diaspora-run 
development organisations in Toronto that are led by young professionals in the business 
and finance industries, who are well-versed in the ubiquitous discourses and practices of 
social innovation, entrepreneurship and corporate social responsibility, are deemed 
legitimate and desirable partners in the international development community. These 
organisations and individuals win out over other grassroots, community-based, or culturally 
focused diaspora organisations whose work may not fit neatly into neoliberal discourses on 
individualised responsibility and thus rely on public spending. Meanwhile, the same 
entrepreneurial Tamils, who were just rewarded for their ability to raise money for 
homeland development initiatives, might also be under surveillance for suspicion of 
directing financial flows to insurgent/violent organisations in the homeland, because they 
are part of the oppressed ethnic minority. Alternatively, their technocratic professionalism, 
the very same quality that allowed them to act with authority in one context, might be 
considered illegitimate in local homeland settings, where cultural knowledge and shared 
experience/grievance outweigh other forms of social capital. 
Political struggles like this remain entirely invisible to scholars who focus their attention 
on the macro level. And yet, it is precisely at this level - of practices amongst sub- and 
transnational networks of actors that diaspora engagement politics are fought out. This, no 
doubt, calls for a reassessment of existing analytical frameworks. Approaches that highlight 
the macro dimensions of diaspora engagement politics and remain tied to an understanding 
of the global order as being divided into nation-states, do not even see the political struggle 
that occurs at the level illustrated here. Thus, in the hope of advancing knowledge on the 
politics of diaspora engagement, in the following paragraphs I will explore the question of 
how we may go about studying them. 
The paper will proceed as follows: first, I will present a brief review of the scholarship 
that deals with power relations in the field of diaspora engagement. I will offer some 
reflections on why these approaches fall short in terms of their conceptualisations of power, 
echoing the familiar agency vs. structure debate in the social sciences, but expanding it to 
include arguments made by critical realists on social ontology. I proceed to argue that the 
politics of diaspora engagement are best studied by employing Bourdieusian practice theory, 
which can offer a way out of the ontological impasse and also gives us a critical 
                                                                                                           
7 Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Francesco Ragazzi, “A Comparative Analysis of Diaspora Policies,” Political Geography 41, (July 2014): 74–89. 
8 Elaine Ho, Mark Boyle, “Migration-as-Development Repackaged? The Globalizing Imperative of the 
Singaporean State’s Diaspora Strategies.” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 36, no.2 (2015): 164–82. 
9 Mark Laffey, Suthaharan Nadarajah, “The Hybridity of Liberal Peace: States, Diasporas and Insecurity.” Security 
Dialogue 43, no.5 (2012): 403–20. 
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understanding of power relations. Finally, I outline how assemblage theory can further a 
post-positivist understanding of the politics of diaspora engagement by making it 
empirically possible to study spaces beyond the state. 
THE POLITICS OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT: A STATE OF THE ART 
What are the politics of diaspora engagement? Who wins and who loses when policy-makers 
decide to engage diasporas and who has the power to decide over the inclusion and 
exclusion into winning and losing camps? In order to answer these questions, we first have 
to have a theory on how and where power operates in the social world. The following 
section will review the extant literature on diaspora engagement and then offer some 
insights on how diaspora agency has been conceptualised in Political Science. 
DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT AND THE STATE 
The most explicit discussion of the politics of diaspora engagement has taken place amongst 
scholars who have sought to make sense of the rapid proliferation of policies and institutions 
of emigrant states targeting their own diasporic populations. The bulk of scholarship has 
focused on explaining why individual states seek to manage10 their diaspora populations, by, 
for example extending voting rights or introducing special visa programmes. For example, 
Mylonas11 suggests that diaspora engagement, which he terms emigrant policies, are part of 
a wider nation-building project, while Gamlen et al.12 have	created a helpful typology for 
understanding why states might want to	respond to the increased political and economic 
importance of	diaspora	by creating diaspora engagement institutions.	Their large-N study 
found that diaspora engagement by states falls into either a ‘tapping’, an ‘embracing’ or a 
‘norm diffusion’ logic. While these scholars can explain why states may seek to engage their 
own populations, drawing barriers of inclusion and exclusion along ethnic and national 
lines, this does not explain the interest in diaspora engagement by transnational and 
supranational actors or migrant-receiving states. 
Others have taken a more macro-perspective, suggesting that diaspora engagement 
primarily benefits powerful western states. Here, the engagement of diasporas by the liberal 
international community is understood to be driven by a will to subjugate and discipline 
global populations.	For example, Latha Varadarajan13 suggests that contemporary state 
attitudes towards diasporas must be understood as part of the hegemony of a neoliberal 
global political economy, whereby diaspora communities offer opportunities for capitalist 
expansion. Meanwhile, Ragazzi14 uses Foucauldian governmentality theory to explain why 
states are increasingly interested in engaging their respective diasporas, in an effort to 
                                                                                                           
10 Harris Mylonas, The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities, (Cambridge 
University Press 2013); Gerasimos Tsourapas, “Why Do States Develop Multi-Tier Emigrant Policies? Evidence 
from Egypt.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41, no. 13 (2015): 2192–2214. 
11 Mylonas, The Politics of Nation-Building. 
12 Gamlen et al., Explaining the Rise of Diaspora Institutions. 
13 Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad. 
14 Ragazzi, “A Comparative Analysis of Diaspora Policies”. 
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reproduce the global political economy. Similarly, Laffey and Nadarajah15 support the view 
that diaspora engagement forms part of a liberal government logic, albeit this time as part of 
a larger effort to securitise and generate liberal order in the pacific region, and the Global 
South more widely. All of these authors offer critical insights into the structural forces that 
drive state-diaspora relations. In contrast to the liberal literature, they also make explicit the 
often-exploitative power relations which underlie diaspora engagement practices. The value 
of these critical contributions for the study of diaspora engagement politics is immense. And 
yet, some shortcomings remain, especially in light of the increasingly complex multi-level 
and multi-actor nature of diaspora engagement. The first problem is that they remain state-
centric. They suggest that the state remains the main locus of power in global politics, and 
yet, diaspora engagement takes place in the spaces between states through networks of 
actors that include the state, but also non-state actors and processes. Only recently, has there 
been a loudening call to decenter the state16 and to bring the role of NSAs to the fore of their 
analysis because clearly “both state and non-state agents are implicated in these projects”17. 
Similarly, others have noted that future studies on diaspora engagement strategies will 
“need to focus more on other actors and spaces” beyond the state18. However, this has yet to 
happen. A second shortcoming of the critical literature is that diaspora engagement is 
understood to be driven by singular overarching structural logics, be it the political economy 
or a liberal governmental rationality. This ‘structure-centrism’ means that they struggle to 
provide much detail as to how the systemic observations that they make might unfold at the 
micro-level. This essentially erases the agency of both the diaspora and the various actors 
that are tasked with engagement. Holzscheiter19 has argued that poststructuralist approaches 
can often fall into this trap of ignoring the existence of social and political agents, or at least 
downplaying the ability of individual agency to bring about meaningful change. In the 
context of my study, such an oversight would mean that I would dismiss as meaningless 
cases in which diaspora engagement policies come to exist as a result of individual action. 
How can this dilemma be overcome? Délano Alonso and Mylonas20 have suggested that we 
need to pay attention to ‘microfoundations’ of diaspora politics. One important aspect of 
these ‘microfoundations’ is diasporic agency. Thus, the following paragraphs will briefly 
outline how the issue of diaspora agency has been approached by scholars of diaspora 
politics.	
                                                                                                           
15 Laffey and Nadarajah, “The Hybridity of Liberal Peace”. 
16 Catherine Ruth Craven, “Thinking about Governance through Diasporas: Decentering the State and 
Challenging the External/Internal Binary,” SFB 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood Working Paper Series, 
(forthcoming 2018). 
17 Elaine Ho. 2011. “‘Claiming’ the Diaspora: Elite Mobility, Sending State Strategies and the Spatialities of 
Citizenship,” Progress in Human Geography 35, no. 6 (2011): 760. 
18 Alexandra Délano, Alan Gamlen, “Comparing and Theorizing State–diaspora Relations” Political Geography 41 
(July 2014): 43–53. 
19 Anna Holzscheiter, “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and 
Analysis in International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2014): 142–62. 
20 Alexandra Délano Alonso, Harris Mylonas, “The Microfoundations of Diaspora Politics: Unpacking the State 
and Disaggregating the Diaspora,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, special issue (2017): 1–19. 
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DIASPORA AGENCY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The bulk of the early literature on diaspora in Political Science suggests that diasporas are 
internally bound actors who have causal impact on the social and political world. Diaspora 
engagement is thus understood as a mode of managing this causal process, to avoid negative 
diaspora impact21. Causal power describes a mechanical and therefore completely apolitical 
process. If diaspora impact (on, for example, civil conflict) can be measured as an 
independent variable, then exterminating the diaspora variable is the only rational policy 
option for modern liberal states. 
Over time, this form of research on diaspora populations has become more differentiated 
and reflexive. In more recent discussions of diaspora mobilisation the individual agency of 
diaspora members is highlighted and they are cast as development entrepreneurs22 or 
mediators in peace processes23. Crucially, in these accounts causal power is transferred to the 
diaspora agent. Subsequently, power struggles between the diaspora and those (global 
governance) actors that are doing the engaging (for example, states, NGOs or IOs) are 
conceptualised as interactions between rational thinking agents, whether driven by a logic of 
profit maximisation or normative appropriateness. In that sense, the politics of diaspora 
engagement are the result of individual speech acts, of persuasion or negotiation. This logic 
of communicative power24, which is based on the writing of Habermas25 and focuses 
exclusively on the micro-level mechanisms employed by individual agents, must confront 
several criticisms. First of all, while interactionist approaches manage to theorise a power 
struggle that takes place in real-time communication, they fail to acknowledge that agents 
who engage in this sort of discursive interaction also exist within a powerful structure. 
According to Anna Holzscheiter, assuming that norms and ideas are pre-given “discursive 
resources that can be intentionally put to use”26 to further individual interests, is somewhat 
problematic. It assumes that discursive power flows simply from one actor to another in a 
discrete social event or speech act.27 Ultimately, the Habermasian conceptualisation of power 
as communicative or deliberative, also encounters significant problems when applied to 
global and/or non-Western contexts, as it presupposes a rational individualist subjectivity 
and is thus anchored in modern enlightenment thinking, all the while holding on to claims of 
universalism and human progress. At the same time, suggesting that all agents have power 
to engage in political struggle for their own advancement completely legitimises any form of 
                                                                                                           
21 Such as violent conflict, e.g. in Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford 
Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Måns Söderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” 
Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 4 (2008): 461–78. 
22 Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs: The In-between Advantage, (Oxford 
University Press 2016). 
23 Bahar Baser, Ashok Swain, “Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts,” 
International Journal on World Peace 25, no. 3 (2008): 7–28. 
24 Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 1 
(2000): 1–39. 
25 Jürgen Habermas, “Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence,” Inquiry 13, no.1-4 (1970): 360–75. 
26 Anna Holzscheiter, Children’s Rights in International Politics: The Transformative Power of Discourse, 
(Springer Press 2010): 37. 
27 Ibid. 
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diaspora engagement policy that recreates injustice or inequality in the world, by suggesting 
that every person has the same tools at their disposal to negotiate for change. Unsurprisingly 
then, it is this decidedly liberal understanding of power (as individualised self- 
empowerment) that is highlighted most in policy circles that advocate for increased diaspora 
engagement. Evidently, where the literature on diaspora engagement is too structure-centric, 
the liberal mainstream of diaspora studies in Political Science overemphasises the power of 
the rational individual agent, often at the expense of social, political and historical context. 
Studying the ‘microfoundations’ of diaspora engagement politics does not mean doing away 
with all the structural constraints that diasporas and other global political actors find 
themselves in. 
What becomes clear in the above paragraphs is that literature on diaspora engagement 
and the literature on diaspora agency both sit at different levels of analysis. And this 
problem of deciding at which level of analysis to situate power dynamics in social 
interactions is as old as social science itself. Accordingly, scholars have long attempted to 
resolve what some refer to as the structuration problem28 or the levels-of-analysis problem29. 
However, most of these studies still give primacy or precedence to a certain causal 
mechanism (agency or structure), level of analysis (micro or macro) or a certain type of 
power (deliberative vs. constructive) when locating political struggles. So, in the seemingly 
endless debate about who has the power to act and to determine political outcomes, my 
suggestion is to look towards an analysis of practices. 
By studying practices, not only can we reconcile the agency of global political actors with 
the structural constraints posed upon them by capitalism or liberal governmentality, we also 
begin to reterritorialise global politics. So, while post-structuralists rightly emphasise the 
spread of ideas and language, they fail to theorise how these processes of diffusion are 
embedded in material realities. The fact that even in critical social science spaces and bodies 
are so often overlooked, is a central tenet of critical realist theorising30. In the next section I 
will outline the conceptual building blocks of my study: practices and assemblages. I will 
conceptualise practices as my unit of analysis though which I can observe the local 
embodiment of global dynamics/structures; and I will locate these practices inside 
assemblages, which are a level of analysis that is different from the state. 
LOCATING POWER IN PRACTICES 
Practice approaches in IR are united by the premise that ontological priority is not given to 
either states, nor individual rational agents, or powerful structures, but instead to practices. 
Practices can be studied at the level of the individual person, where they might constitute a 
                                                                                                           
28 As identified by both Giddens and Wendt; Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration, (University of California Press 1984); Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in 
International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no.3 (1987): 335–70. 
29 Henry R. Nau, Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas, (CQ Press 2014). 
30 Roy Bhaskar, “Realism in the Natural Sciences”, ed. L. Jonathan Cohen, Jerzy Łoś, Helmut Pfeiffer, and Klaus-
Peter Podewski, (Elsevier 1982), 337–54. 
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handshake or a wink31, or, at a more collective level, in the form of diplomatic practices32 or 
discourses and norms33. What is essential, however, is that rather than looking at these things 
occurring in the world and asking what (kind of logic) they represent34, we take the practice 
itself seriously. Practices themselves are powerful and meaningful, not only as 
representations of structural or cognitive realms of consciousness. A practice always contains 
within it agency and structure. As it is embodied/enacted, it denotes an agent’s positioning 
within a structure.35 Thus, states and non-state actors, both individual and collective all have 
ontologically equal capability to act, and yet their positioning may be radically different. 
Beside decentering the state from its position as primary unit of analysis, by thinking about 
the world as constituted by practices we can also overcome the positivist inclination to 
search for an elusive a priori truth behind an action that we can never feasibly get at. Finally, 
practices ground structures in time and space and give them a material dimension (the body 
of the agent), thus countering the extreme ontological relativism of most post-structural 
approaches. 
While a practice approach takes us some way towards overcoming the state-centric, 
positivist spectre that haunts the social sciences it does not, in and of itself, offer a theory on 
power which can shed light on the politics of diaspora engagement. It is specifically 
Bourdieu’s practice theory which is required for this. Bourdieu’s theory of power is a 
hierarchical one, rooted in neo-marxist theorising. In order to understand how power 
functions according to Bourdieu, we must familiarise ourselves with a few of his central 
concepts. 
First of all, key to overcoming the agent-structure divide explored above is Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus. Habitus circumvents what I have referred to above as the structuration 
problem, by making social practices not simply the outcome of mechanical imposition of 
structures or the free intentional pursuits of individuals36, but as the embodied interplay 
between agency and structure. In the words of Wacquant, habitus 
is a mediating notion that revokes the common sense duality between the individual 
and the social by capturing ‘the internalisation of externality and the externalisation 
of internality’ [in the famous expression of Bourdieu], that is, the way society 
becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained 
capacities and structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determinate ways, 
                                                                                                           
31 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” The Cultural Geography Reader, 
(Taylor and Francis Group 2008). 
32 Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” Millennium 31, no. 3 
(2002): 627–51. 
33 Holzscheiter “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification.” 
34 Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” International 
Organization 62, no. 2 (2008): 257–88. 
35 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International 
Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997): 365–92. 
36 Holzscheiter “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification.” 
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which then guide them in their creative responses to the constraints and solicitations 
of their extant milieu.37 
While habitus explains how agents enact and perform structures in the social world, the 
concept does not in and of itself explain exactly which practices end up being performed in a 
specific time and place. For this we must explore additional concepts. For Bourdieu, the 
concept of habitus is intimately tied to the concept of capital, in that habitus is essentially 
conditioned by it. Capital determines the power and position of an actor within a social 
order. Crucially however, capital is not just economic – as most Marxist scholars would 
argue - but also cultural and social. Whether capital actually translates to power is context-
specific. Different contexts contain different hierarchical orderings of capital. Finally, 
Bourdieu conceptualises this context as a field. A field represents an arena or milieu of social 
interaction that is characterised by a particular hierarchical distribution of different forms of 
capital.38 While one field may be structured so that economic capital is causally powerful, in 
another cultural capital may rank higher. In other words, it is a “structured space” that is 
organised around specific types of capital or combinations of capital.39 This means that those 
actors who (through their specific intersubjective habitus) possess the dominant form of 
capital in a field are essentially more powerful in a given historically contingent context. 
Practices can then be understood as the outcomes of the constellations of habitus and capital 
within a field. Because distribution of capital is field specific and historically contingent, the 
struggle for power is the central dynamic of social life for Bourdieu. 
In sum, a practice-based ontology allows us to overcome both the agent-structure divide 
in social research, and also circumvents the ontological fallacy of positivism. On top of this, 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of practices as being hierarchically ordered within distinct 
social fields offers a theory of power, which can help us to explain the politics of global 
diaspora engagement. Let’s briefly think back to our empirical example of young 
professional Tamil diaspora entrepreneurs. When we conceptualise diaspora engagement 
practices as taking place in different social fields, we are no longer at a loss to explain how 
struggles for power, legitimacy or political gain might play out differently depending on the 
hierarchical ordering of (social) capital in each field. And yet, Bourdieu alone cannot account 
for the politics of diaspora engagement in their full global complexity. His theory of power 
as embodied everyday struggles over capital is still intimately tied to his primary object of 
research – the French ruling class in the middle of the 20th century. Fields are very much 
imagined as existing within French national culture. In our effort to ontologically de-centre 
the state in our analysis of global diaspora engagement politics, we need to find a way of 
reshuffling Bourdieu’s practice theory and his concept of the social field to a level beyond or 
                                                                                                           
37 Loïc Wacquant, “Habitus,” eds. Beckert, Jens, and Milan Zafirovski International Encyclopedia of Economic 
Sociology, (Routledge 2013). 
38 Zander Navarro, “In Search of a Cultural Interpretation of Power: The Contribution of Pierre Bourdieu,” IDS 
Bulletin 37, no. 6 (2006): 11–22. 
39 Ibid.: 18. 
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other than the state40, without simply scaling-up the assumption of a priori existing 
structures. This would simply reproduce the ontological positivism of state-centric social 
science on another level, e.g. the international system of states. We instead require a more 
flexible and abductive way of studying how practices of diaspora engagement are ordered in 
the social world without giving ontological priority to any one social structure (i.e. the state). 
In the next section I thus want to unravel the idea of state centrism in social research further 
and discuss how scholars of IR and Transnationalism Studies have attempted to overcome it. 
OVERCOMING STATE-CENTRISM AND METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM 
As I suggest in the literature review, one of the most often lamented shortcomings of existing 
approaches to the study of diaspora engagement is their state centrism. That there is a near-
consensus regarding the need to include actors other than the state in order for analysis of 
diaspora engagement to be meaningful might seem commonsensical. However, it is crucial 
to look in more detail at the grounds upon which this need is articulated. This is because 
there is a crucial and consequential (ontological) difference between a) simply adding non-
state actors to the scientific equation, b) historicising and/or decentering the state thus 
gnawing at the foundations of methodological nationalism and c) explicitly addressing the 
impasse that is intrinsic to methodological nationalism, which is its ontological positivism. I 
would argue that most of the existing calls to broaden the focus of study in political science 
and IR in particular have remained at stages a) and b). The following section will thus 
explore in more detail how and why scholars have argued for the need to de-centre the state 
in the analysis of transnational phenomena in the social sciences. 
State-centrism in IR commonly describes the condition whereby the nation-state is 
understood as the primary unit of analysis in research. It follows that, in order to overcome 
this state-centrism, we simply need to include more actors in our analysis. This approach has 
been taken by various scholars in global governance research, following the broadening of 
the field of IR to include actors above and beyond the nation state. The development occurs 
as both liberal rationalists and constructivists begin to acknowledge that domestic, as well 
and trans- or supranational actors have a role to play in shaping state interests and the 
international environment. And yet, ontologically these actors then still exist only in relation 
to the state that they are influencing. This does not change the fundamental understanding 
that the world is oriented around the concept of the nation-state, with some additional actors 
operating below or above the national level and does nothing to actually address the 
scientific shortcomings of state-centrism in social research. 
Unsurprisingly, some of the deeper and more refined critiques of state-centrism in the 
social sciences come from scholars of transnational migration processes. Accordingly, 
Wimmer and Glick Schiller41 have explored the concept of methodological nationalism (MN), 
                                                                                                           
40 See, for example, Loïc Wacquant, “Bourdieu Comes to Town: Pertinence, Principles, Applications,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 42, no.1 (2018): 90–105; Mike Savage, Laurie Hanquinet, Niall Cunningham, 
and Johs Hjellbrekke, “Emerging Cultural Capital in the City: Profiling London and Brussels,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 42, no. 1 (2018): 138–49. 
41 Andreas Wimmer, Nina Glick-Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of 
Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology,” The International Migration Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 576–610. 
Article / Critical Realism, assemblages and practices beyond the state 
110 
which describes the “naturalization of a global regime of nation-states by the social 
sciences.” They identify three variants of MN, namely the lack of a problematisation of the 
importance of nationalism to the modern Western project, its naturalisation through 
institutional practice, and as territorial delimitation. The critique that underlies MN is that 
concepts of nation and state structure our perception of social reality but often disappear as 
objects of critical inquiry. Thus, MN limits the ability of social scientists and historians to 
perceive processes that are above or below the level of the nation-state, for example, 
transnational processes such as migration, but also processes of global public policy making 
such as diaspora engagement. This critique of MN goes much deeper that the call to 
diversify the group of actors that operate in IR. It aims to de-centre the state in order to 
empower these other actors who engage in processes that cross state borders and are 
consequently vilified and criminalised for it. Overcoming MN is seen then as an essential 
step towards conducting empirical research that does not reproduce and reifying those 
analytical categories that are reductive, structurally violent, or western-centric. While I am 
sympathetic to this scientific endeavour, I am skeptical that it can be achieved without truly 
confronting the ontological roots of the problem. Without doing so, the logic of state-
centrism will simply manifest in social science via another dogmatic and reified concept, 
even if it is now no longer the state. This is because methodological nationalism stands in for 
a much deeper underlying problem inherent in all (Western) social theory (but IR in 
particular), produced by its emergence out of modernist/enlightenment thinking. With this 
claim I echo Daniel Chernilo42, who suggests that in order to transcend Methodological 
Nationalism we need to look at the foundational period of the (Western) social sciences. He 
argues that during its foundational period, all (Western) social theory strove towards 
universalism and the generalisability of ‘natural law’. Therefore, social theory as a search for 
natural law ultimately requires ontological positivism. So, even though much of social theory 
in the 20th and 21st century has sought to shed its links to the notion of natural law (IR maybe 
less so), many of its presumptions are still deeply entrenched. For example, most post-
modern or post-structuralist IR theory, even if it is able to challenge and historicise the 
nation-state, has largely failed to come up with alternative notions of how the contemporary 
world is structured. Thus, in order to offer a truly emancipatory analysis of the politics of 
diaspora engagement we need an alternative way of studying the social world, which does 
not rely on structuring it into preexisting categories, but is open to the fluidity, messiness 
and emergence of social structures. To summarise, if power resides in practices, in order to 
study the politics of global diaspora engagement we need to elevate the Bourdieusian field to 
a level beyond the state. However, we need to do this without reproducing the positivist 
ontology of other approaches that claim to address the issue of state-centrism. In the 
following, I will suggest that the concept of the assemblage as understood by critical realists, 
holds some promise in this regard. 	  
                                                                                                           
42 Daniel Chernilo, “Social Theory’s Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality,” European Journal of Social 
Theory 9, no. 1 (2006): 5–22. 
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THE PROMISE OF ASSEMBLAGES: ACCESSING GLOBAL SOCIAL FIELDS 
Within critical realist theorising, assemblages have emerged as an important conceptual tool, 
one which has only recently been embraced by scholars of IR and Public Policy. In IR the 
concept has been applied by Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams in their study of global 
security assemblages.43 They define assemblages as “disaggregated structures with both 
material and immaterial dimensions” that function as a sort of a system of relations between 
humans and non-humans. Further, Acuto and Curtis44 argue that “this ontology can provide 
a valuable starting point for the analysis of various social actors, including transnational 
corporations, institutional networks, epistemic communities, nation-states, cities, and 
terrorist networks” because as assemblages these actors are no longer incommensurable. The 
most important feature of assemblage theory for the study of the politics of diaspora 
engagement is thus, arguably, that it presupposes a flat ontology meaning that all social 
actors (from the sub-individual to the global or transnational) are best studied as 
assemblages of their component parts, which are in themselves assemblages. The 
differentiation between levels of analysis becomes obsolete. 
Assemblage theory lets us imagine the world as made up of complex configurations of 
human and non-human agents, in which the state becomes only one of many possible 
configurations. By casting the state as an assemblage we decenter its ontological primacy. 
This does not mean that the state is no longer a powerful agent. What it does mean is that, 
whether and how the state (as an assemblage) has power to act, is now an empirical 
question. With regard to our attempt at applying Bourdieusian practice theory to the study 
of diaspora engagement politics, assemblage theory thus suggests that anyone can be an 
agent engaged in practices; not just states. 
Further to broadening the scope of actors that partake in practices, the assemblage 
concept allows us to look at global politics or global governance and see not just a collection 
of states and non-state actors but to see clusters or compounds of processes, actors, 
institutions, sites and policies, that all share a certain relationship or goal (or logic). This 
relationship can be characterised in a variety of ways by a common identity45, or common 
understandings of territory, authority and rights46, once firmly embedded in national 
institutional frames. In that sense an assemblage, much like a social field in the Bourdieusian 
sense, is held together by a shared structuring logic, be that a “common identity” or a 
“common understanding of territory, authority and rights”. If we translate these structuring 
logics into the language of Bourdieu, we can effortlessly recast them as the hierarchical 
distribution of capital within a field. In sum, assemblage theory offers a means to think about 
a global social field and thus of applying Bourdieusian practice theory to the study of the 
complex global politics of diaspora engagement. This is because it not only meaningfully 
                                                                                                           
43 Rita Abrahamsen, Michael C. Williams, “Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in 
International Politics,” International Political Sociology 3, no.1 (2009): 1–17. 
44 Michele Acuto, Simon Curtis, “Assemblage Thinking and International Relations,” eds. Michele Acuto, Simon 
Curtis, Reassembling International Theory, (Palgrave Pivot 2014): 1–15. 
45 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi. 
2nd edition, (University of Minnesota Press 1987). 
46 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press 2008). 
Article / Critical Realism, assemblages and practices beyond the state 
112 
expands the group of actors that we consider to be powerful agents in the world and places 
them on a flat ontological plane. But it also allows us to imagine and thus study a politics of 
diaspora engagement which operates across multiple assemblages and thus with multiple 
structuring logics and hierarchies of practices. 
CONCLUSION AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the preceding paragraphs, I have attempted to draw up a new theoretical framework for 
the study of the politics of diaspora engagement. After reviewing the state of the art 
literature on diaspora engagement by state and non-state actors, I concluded that these 
approaches could not shed adequate light on the politics and power struggles that 
characterise the diaspora engagement they describe. I suggested that this was the case for 
two reasons: first, because existing conceptualisation of power in diaspora engagement were 
caught in the aporia of the levels-of-analysis-problem, and second, because accounts of 
diaspora engagement overwhelmingly fell into the trap of methodological nationalism. I 
then suggested a two-pronged approach to address these issues. I proposed first a practice 
approach to the study of diaspora engagement, resting on the theoretical propositions of 
Pierre Bourdieu, which would overcome the levels-of-analysis-problem and also offer a 
critical reading of the power relations that characterised diaspora engagement practices. I 
then argued that, in order to apply Bourdieusian practice theory to the study of the (global) 
politics of diaspora engagement we need to reconceptualise two things a) the actors who 
were doing the practicing, and b) the spaces in which the practices were occurring. 
Ultimately, I concluded that, in order to even imagine powerful actors and spaces beyond 
the state,we needed to overcome the persistent ontological positivism of most mainstream 
but also much critical scholarship on diaspora engagement. In the final section, I discussed 
the ways in which assemblage theory could open up such avenues for post-positivist 
theorising and research and finally attempted to illustrate how assemblages could be 
combined with Bourdieusian practice theory to shed light on the politics of diaspora 
engagement, both theoretically and empirically. 
While this paper has focused on ways in which to theoretically access and make visible 
the complex and multi-scalar/multi-actor phenomenon that is global diaspora engagement, I 
want to also briefly reflect on the promise that this theoretical model holds for empirical 
application. I have mentioned above that, far from being fixed and stable, assemblages (of 
states, of global governance, or of diaspora engagement) are always emerging. It follows that 
any analysis of them will only be a snapshot of a particular space in a particular time. Even 
though this means that assemblages do not fulfill the requirements for universal and 
generalisable research categories they make possible abductive theorising and rich empirical 
research. By not assuming the prior and unchanging existence of any social or natural facts, 
such as the primacy of states or the stability of state borders, they hold much promise for the 
study of the politics of diaspora engagement. And yet, this is easier said than done. Precisely 
because assemblages are abductively generated, we don’t know what they look like until we 
have accessed them epistemologically. This has implications for empirical research. Rather 
than entering the field with preconceived analytical categories, which in the case of IR tend 
to be steeped in eurocentrism, post-positivist research requires fieldwork to be iterative and 
non-linear, to be able to take seriously alternative ways of knowing and thinking about the 
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world. And while this reflexivity is necessary for scholars seeking to combine realist 
ontologies with relativist epistemologies, it is also crucial that this catches on outside of niche 
philosophy of science debates. 
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